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CIVIL COMMITMENT: RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY DISABLED, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS AND
TRENDS
Edward B. Beis*
The 1967 Mental Health Code was considered an enlightened legislative
approach to the area of the civil commitment of mentally disabled. The
area has become confused both in terms of legal practice and medical
treatment. Mr. Beis presents a lucid account of what the law has been and
should be based on his experience in Cook County and on the statutory
and case-law development, He sets forth a very instructive article outlining
the -specific procedure for committing individuals and analyzes the attorney's
role in the attorney-client relationship. Mr. Beis sees civil commitment as
a matter of the protection of the individual's rights as well as a means of
helping a client medically.
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own
good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of
theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian
of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are
greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves,
than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.'
N 1967 the Illinois Legislature enacted a Mental Health Code2
which provides substantial protections for persons admitted, volun-
tarily or involuntarily, to mental hospitals. The purpose of this
article is to give attorneys unfamiliar with mental health law a basic
understanding of how the process works in Cook County. Also to be
discussed will be the recent developments which affect the rights
of the mentally disabled and whether, in view of these developments,
the Code as implemented adequately protects persons falling within
its purview.
HOSPITALIZATION PROCEDURE
There are several procedures available for the hospitalization of
a person who is believed to be in need of mental health care. A
* Director, Patient Legal Services, Cook County Legal Assistance Foundation,
Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
1. J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (Gateway ed. 1962) [emphasis added].
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/, §§ 1-1 et seq. (1971) [hereinafter referred to as
the "Code"].
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person who desires treatment may go to the intake unit of a facility
and request either an "informal" or a "voluntary" admission-the
latter is by far more common than the former.3 A person who
is diagnosed as afflicted with a mental disorder and who does not
desire treatment may be involuntarily hospitalized
if that person, as a result of such mental disorder, is reasonably expected
at the time the determination is being made or within a reasonable time
thereafter to intentionally or unintentionally physically injure either him-
self or other persons, or is unable to care for himself so as to guard him-
self from physical injury or to provide for his own physical needs. 4
Should it be decided that involuntary admission is necessary, three
methods are available: emergency admission, which is the most
widely used;' admission on the certificate of a physician;' and a
petition for examination and hearing upon a court order.
The situation where a person must be involuntarily committed
poses a problem. An effort should be made to persuade that person
to voluntarily seek assistance. If this fails, trickery should not be
used:
What do you tell the patient? Whatever you do, don't lie. Don't tell
him he is going for a ride in the country to get the fresh air or that he is
going to a nursing home or some other transparent fiction. Tell him
that he is disturbed, or a bit high, or too depressed, or upset--or whatever
is the truth-and that he is going to be hospitalized until he gets over this.
You can say frankly that if he will go along without fuss, there will be no
police, no goggle-eyed neighbors. And if you can't persuade him to go
quietly, it is better to use force than fraud.7
Before the situation reaches a crisis stage, the family may have
3. Only .006% of the admissions to state hospitals in Illinois in 1972 were
"informal", while over 70% were "voluntary". ILL. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH,
Net Additions to Inpatient Mental Health and Mental Retardation Facilities and
Direct Admissions According to Mental Health Code Legal Status on Admissions,
table 2 in MENTAL HEALTH STATISTICS FOR ILLINOIS, FISCAL YEAR 1972 [hereinafter
cited as STATISTICS]. In Cook County, "informal" admissions constituted only .4%
and "voluntary" 63.9% of all admissions. Id.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-11 (Supp. 1972).
5. STATISTICS, supra note 3. In Cook County, the emergency admission is
routine. In 1972, there were 3,013 emergency admissions as opposed to only 342
on a physician's certificate in Cook County. Statewide in 1972, there were 4,776
admissions under emergency petitions and 1,947 on the certificate of a physician.
ld. For a discussion of the use of the emergency procedure outside of Cook
County, see Brakel and South, Diversion from the Criminal Process in the Rural
Community, 7 AM. CRiM. L.Q. 122, 170 (1969).
6. See note 58 inf ra.
7. Davidson, Commitment in a Hurry, 3 EMERGENCY MEDICINE 90, 95 (1971).
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sought help from one of the social agencies in Cook County." Gen-
erally, the family will simply take the person to the hospital against
his will. The concerned party-usually a family member or relative
-- can also go to the State's Attorney and request, by means of a
petition for hospitalization, that the person be involuntarily taken
to the hospital by the police. Anyone who is eighteen years or older
may file this petition. The State's Attorney will then interview the
petitioner as to the reasons why the person is felt to be in need
of hospitalization. In Cook County, the State's Attorney requires
that the petitioner sign a statement9 under oath to support the
petition. This statement declares that the person in need of mental
treatment has not been examined by a physician and sets forth the
reasons why. Commonly, the person in need of mental treatment
has refused to be examined by a physician. The statement must
also present facts which led the petitioner to believe that the person
is in need of mental treatment, for example, "subject is threatening
to kill his family and exhibiting suicidal tendencies."' 10 The peti-
tioner must also state that he is not involved in any legal controversy,
either civil or criminal in nature, with the person alleged to be
in need of mental treatment. This sworn statement supports the "Peti-
tion for Hospitalization" which is signed by the petitioner." The
State's Attorney arranges for the preparation of the "Order for Deten-
tion and Examination"' 2 and the "Writ for Detention, Examination
and Appearance Before a Court."' The Petition, with the statement,
is presented to the court and, if the judge grants the motion for
8. The Chicago Board of Health, for example, operates 18 community health
centers where help may be sought. Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 7, 1973 at 12, col. 1.
9. "Statement in Support of Petition for Emergency Detention and Examina-
tion of a Person in Need of Mental Treatment." This affidavit is an unofficial form
which contains general conclusions and is usually retained by the State's Attorney.
10. This summary sentence was on a statement in a recent case handled by the
author. The case is not cited in order to protect the identity of the respondent.
11. Il. Dep't of Mental Health Code form [hereinafter cited as MHC form] 7
(1969) [hereinafter referred to as the "Petition"]. The Department of Mental
Health prescribes all forms "necessary or desirable for proceedings under the Mental
Health Code." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 3-2 (1971). For a compilation of the
prescribed forms, see ILL. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, FoRMs PRESCRIBED IN COM-
PLIANCE WITH MENTAL HEALTH CODE (Jan. 1, 1968).
12. MHC form 10 (1968).
13. MHC form 11 (1968).
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detention and examination, he signs the order and the writ. In
Cook County, the writ usually directs the police to apprehend and
transport the person alleged to be in need of mental treatment to
a hospital for an admission under the emergency procedure. This
writ procedure is not a major means by which persons are ad-
mitted to the hospital. The State's Attorney refuses to request a
writ in about fifty percent of the cases in which his office is asked
to proceed.
Another way for a person to end up at the hospital is through
the criminal law process. The police are often called when someone
is creating a disturbance in a public place, such as on a street, or
in a restaurant or a theatre. If such a person appears to have a
mental problem or is known to have a history of hospitalization for
mental problems, the police will usually take him directly to the
hospital. On the other hand, the police may take such a person
to the police station, place charges against him, usually disorderly
conduct, and then decide the person has a mental problem and take
him to the hospital. The police may also take the person to the
emergency room of a medical hospital where a physician will sign
a certificate. Then the police will take the person to the mental hos-
pital. 4 Thus, a person incarcerated in the county jail may be sent
to the hospital because the jail physician concludes that he has a
mental problem.
When a person appears in court on a misdemeanor charge, either
the defense attorney or the State's Attorney may ask the court to
order an examination if either feels the person to have a mental
problem. If the court so orders, the person is sent to the Psychiatric
Institute of Cook County for an examination. If, in the opinion
of the examining psychiatrist, the person is in need of mental treat-
ment, a Petition and a Physician's Certificate will be filed by the
psychiatrist and the person will be sent to the hospital.15
14. A police officer has no authority to involuntarily take a person to the hos-
pital without either a Petition or an Application for Hospitalization and a "Certifi-
cate of Need for Hospitalization". ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 912, § 3-4 (1971). How-
ever, the solution is not to force a situation wherein the police charge the in-
dividual with disorderly conduct before he is hospitalized.
15. Two authors note that in Chicago in 1970 the courts referred over 6100
misdemeanor cases to the Psychiatric Institute and that, in about a third of these
cases, the defendant was transferred to the mental hospital. Gilboy & Schmidt,
1973]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
A person charged with a felony may be sent to the Psychiatric
Institute for an examination in order to determine whether he is
fit to stand trial, that is, whether he is able to "understand the nature
and purpose of the proceedings against him" and is able to cooperate
with his counsel in the preparation of his defense.' 6 If the psy-
chiatrist determines that the person is unfit to stand trial, a hearing
is held. If the court also finds that the person is unfit to stand
trial, it will place him in the custody of the Department of Mental
Health and he will be sent to a mental hospital. 17
Admission to a Hospital
A person arrivimg at the hospital will be taken immediately to
the intake unit. A social worker interviews the person and com-
pletes an intake summary which includes personal information, the
circumstances surrounding and the reasons for the person's presence
at the hospital, and a diagnostic impression. This information may
be obtained from persons who accompany the patient to the hospital
-family members, police officers or jail officials. The patient is
also asked to fill out an intake questionnaire which contains such
general information as the patient's address, social security number,
age, income, place of employment, whether the patient has been
previously hospitalized, whether the patient is a veteran and the
names and addresses of the nearest relatives.
The patient is then examined by a physician who makes a diag-
nosis. One author has described what the physician should look
for in his examination:
You note the patient's general appearance, tidiness, and whether he is bed-
ridden, chairbound, or ambulatory. Is he aware of his surroundings and
well oriented? Is he restless, overactive, silly, mute, overtalkative, coher-
ent, or talking under pressure? What is his mood? How deep is the
mood, how stable, and how appropriate to the situation? How well does
he remember recent and remote events? Does he have any grandiose
delusions, ideas of personal unworthiness, or sense of being persecuted?
"Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 429, 444 (1971)
[hereinafter referred to as "Gilboy & Schmidt"].
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1 (Supp. 1973).
17. This brief examination hardly exhausts all the means by which a person
may arrive at the hospital, e.g., a patient in a medical hospital which has no
psychiatric ward will be sent to a mental hospital because of an attempted suicide
or some other manifestation of a mental problem.
[Vol. 23:42
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Does he have visual or auditory hallucinations? Does he consider himself
mentally ill?' s
If the physician believes that the person is in need of assistance with
a mental problem and the person, in fact, wishes to be admitted
to the hospital, he usually will allow the person to sign in as a
"voluntary" patient. However, the physician could allow the person
to be admitted on an "informal" basis, but this rarely occurs in Cook
County.19
If the person is at the hospital involuntarily and the opinion of
the physician is that he has a mental problem, the physician usually
will encourage him to become a "voluntary" patient. Thus, some
persons who are brought to the hospital involuntarily stay on a "vol-
untary" basis. If the person refuses, the physician then must deter-
mine, whether in his opinion, the person is in need of mental treat-
ment as defined by the Code.2" If the physician so finds, he must
prepare a "Certificate of Need for Hospitalization" certifying that the
person is in need of mental treatment, before the person can be
involuntarily admitted.2 The physician should be as specific as pos-
sible:
If he [the patient] has an idea that he is being persecuted, for instance, it
is not enough to write that. Illustrate by quoting what he actually says
to that effect.
If the patient tells you, "They look at me in a very suspicious way," write
it down just like that, in quotation marks. Don't write: "Patient thinks
they look at him in a funny way."
Perhaps another physician has just heavily sedated the patient with tran-
quilizers, barbiturates, or other medications. If he is then confused, un-
responsive, or mute, it is unfair to note that on a commitment paper
without specifying that he was also oversedated-and, if you know, with
what.22
Information might be obtained by asking relatives or other persons
whether the patient had made any recent overt threats of violence
18. Davidson, supra note 7, at 95.
19. For the difference between an "informal" admission and a "voluntary"
admission, see text accompanying notes 40-56, infra.
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 1-11 (Supp. 1972). This is the statutory
definition of in need of mental treatment.
21. For a discussion of the involuntary procedure, see text accompanying notes
57-85, infra. The Certificate of Need for Hospitalization, MHC form 4 (July,
1973) is hereinafter referred to as the "Physician's Certificate."
22. Davidson, supra note 7 at 95.
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or had actually harmed himself or others. One might also ask
[does he drink excessively or use marijuana, "speed," L.S.D., opiates,
barbiturates, or other mood-influencing drugs? Can these people describe
any manifestations of destructive or suicidal behavior? Does the patient
have a history of spells or seizures? Is he literate in English? Is he men-
tally retarded? Has he worked regularly?23
After the interviews and examination, the physician and the social
worker each make out reports on the patient. The physician will
also have given the patient a physical examination, generally writing
out a prescription for him, and ordering that routine lab work, such
as urinalysis, blood tests, x-rays, and tests for venereal disease, be
conducted.
Once the examinations are completed, a security guard will take
the patient's clothing and money. Any amount of money in excess
of five dollars, which the patient may keep with him, is placed in
a trust fund. With regards to security generally, if the patient is
charged with a misdemeanor other than disorderly conduct under
the city ordinance, 24 he is sent to the mittimus unit2" which has
greater security than the other wards. If the person is charged with
a felony he is sent to a special unit at the Illinois State Psychiatric
Institute. A security guard or aide will take the patient to the as-
signed ward. If the patient is violent, he may be placed in re-
straints.26
Treatment
Upon arrival at the ward, the patient is introduced to a member
of the nursing staff. The nurse tries to make the patient feel at
ease and will inquire about any physical problems. The nurse be-
gins a chart on the patient with the documents sent from the intake
unit.27 The progress of the patient can be ascertained by a careful
23. Id.
24. MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO ch. 193, § 1(a) (1969).
25. Patients who are placed in this unit cannot be released upon discharge, but
must be held for the sheriff because they have criminal charges pending and
normally have not made bond. There are no ground passes available as in the other
wards.
26. Restraints usually consist of broad leather straps placed around one of the
patient's forearms and one of his legs, which then are attached to a bed. See
text accompanying note 221, infra.
27. These include the intake summary, the intake questionnaire, the reports of
the physician and social worker, legal papers (e.g., voluntary application, Physi-
[Vol. 23:42
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review of this chart.28
Most patients are assigned to therapy groups the following day.
Medication, however, normally begins immediately unless it is for
an involuntary patient who objects to the medication and is await-
ing a hearing, which in Cook County is held from two to four days
after admission. 29 A person may be forced to take medication if
he is acting in such a manner as to be a danger to himself
or others." A patient has a right to make phone calls (there is
usually a pay phone in the ward), write letters and receive visitors,
although visitors who may have a detrimental effect on the mental
health of the patient may be denied this privilege. The patient
may also be given a grounds pass which allows him access to the
hospital grounds, the work shop and other areas. A patient also
may be given a "buddy" pass which allows him off the ward with
another patient.
The Code provides that all patients are "entitled to adequate and
humane care and treatment."'" The right of an involuntary patient
to treatment is now in the process of being litigated in many states.82
Consent of the patient or his guardian or conservator must be ob-
tained for some treatment, for example, electro-shock treatment or
psycho-surgery.
3
cian's Certificate, criminal complaints and bond sheets) and prescription and
routine lab orders.
28. The chart is comprised of a face sheet with general information, a physi-
cian's order listing prescriptions and lab work orders and progress notes which are
comments on the patient by the physician, therapist, and nursing staff. At the
beginning of these progress notes is a form entitled "Guidelines for Compre-
hensive Treatment Planning" which contains a summary of the patient's situation.
This form includes the following information: the patient's present complaint, a
physical, mental and social evaluation, a staff member's statement of understanding
of the patient's situation, diagnoses using terminology of the Ill. Dep't of Mental
Health Manual, treatment plans, discharge plans, notes on the progress of the patient,
notes on medication given, lab reports, psychiatric evaluations, legal documents,
and other miscellaneous information.
29. See text accompanying note 161, infra.
30. See text accompanying note 189, infra. A competent person may not be
forced to receive medical treatment over his religious objections. In re Estate of
Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). See also Winter v. Miller,
446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971).
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 12-1 (1971).
32. See text accompanying notes 196-209, infra.
33. See text accompanying notes 210-19, infra.
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The hospitals in Cook County provide short term treatment. If
the patient shows no improvement within sixty days, the hospital
may transfer him to a downstate hospital for long term treatment.
If the patient is violent and either threatens or actually harms himself
or others, the ward staff may request that the patient be transferred
to the maximum security hospital at Chester. The patient is entitled
to an administrative hearing on this issue. 4 Until the hearing, the
patient will be housed in the mittimus unit.
Involuntary commitments are indefinite in length since the patient
is to remain in the hospital until he is no longer in need of mental
treatment. If the patient wishes to leave he may file a "Petition
for Discharge. ' 35  This must be accompanied by a certificate of a
physician or psychologist stating that the patient is no longer in need
of mental treatment. 3  The patient may file a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus to have his confinement reviewed. There are also
periodic reviews of the patient's mental condition as required by
the Code.87
If the patient is admitted on a "voluntary" basis, he may sign
a request for release"' and the hospital must either discharge him
within five working days or file a Petition for Hospitalization and
Physician's Certificate to initiate proceedings for an involuntary com-
mitment. If the patient has been admitted on an "informal" basis,
he may leave at any time during the day hours of operation.89
ADMISSIONS
Voluntary Admission
In Illinois, there are two procedures for the voluntary admission
of persons to a mental hospital for treatment-the "informal" ad-
mission and the "voluntary" admission. A person admitted under
34. See text accompanying notes 238-42, infra.
35. MHC form 21 (1968).
36. "Certificate of Physician/Psychologist for Petition for Discharge," MHC
form 23 (1968). This form is not to be confused with a Physician's Certificate,
supra note 21, MHC form 4 (1968).
37. See text accompanying notes 228-30, infra.
38. "Request for Release of Patient on Informal or Voluntary Admission,"
MHC form 26 (1968).
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91/2, § 4-1 (1971).
[Vol. 23:42
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the "informal" procedure4" is free to leave at any time during speci-
fied day hours and must be informed of this right "in writing and
orally, in a language he understands, at the time of admission.'
A person admitted under the "voluntary" procedure" may leave
the hospital within five working days after giving "written notice
of his desire to leave"'4 to any professional staff person, unless, prior
to leaving, either the patient withdraws such request by a written
retraction,44 or someone initiates proceedings for his involuntary
commitment.4 5
Mental health professionals consider the voluntary admission to
a mental hospital far more beneficial to a person than an involuntary
admission:
There is no question but that the prognosis for a motivated patient who
takes the first hard step of acknowledging his need for help and seeking
such help on his own initiative is very much better than for patients forced
to enter treatment against their will. In addition, voluntary patients for the
40. Id. A request is made by signing a "Request for Informal Admission,"
MHC form 1 (1968).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 4-1 (1971). A copy of the "Application for
Voluntary Admission," MHC form 2 (1968) (hereinafter referred to as the "Ap-
plication"), which contains a statement of the patient's right to leave, must be
given to the patient and that right must be explained in language that the patient
understands. A copy of the Application must also be given to any person who
accompanies the patient to the hospital. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 5-2 (1971).
While a voluntary patient under the age of eighteen may not sign the Application,
he may, if he is thirteen years or older, request his own release. In the past the De-
partment of Mental Health failed to inform persons under the age of eighteen of
their right to leave and to give them a copy of the Application. The department
also refused to allow them to sign a "Request for Release of Patient on Informal or
Voluntary Admission," MHC form 26 (1968). However, in 1972, a court held that
"[s]uch a procedure is not consistent with the language of the statute and is a prac-
tice which does deny" persons under eighteen of their fourteenth amendment rights
to due process and equal protection. In re Lee, Nos. 68 J(D) 1362, 66 J(D) 6383
(Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty., Ill., order of February 29, 1972) (unpublished).
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91/, §§ 5-1 to 5-3 (1971). A person who is eighteen
years old may himself sign the Application or a relative or attorney may sign, with
the person's consent, on his behalf. If a person is under eighteen, "a parent,
guardian, person in loco parentis, the Department of Corrections or Department of
Children and Family Services" must sign the Application. Id. at § 5-2 (1971).
43. MHC form 26 (1968).
44. Some wards type up a retraction while others utilize an unnumbered form
entitled "Retraction of Request to Leave" which is authorized by ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 91 , § 5-3 (1971). Hospital personnel often times try to convince a patient
to retract his request to leave based on the argument that he is still in need of
treatment.
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 5-3 (1971).
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most part seek assistance at an earlier stage of their illness, at a time
when the therapeutic intervention can be maximally effective. 46
Illinois' "informal" procedure is considered the ideal form of ad-
mission;
The ideal would be a hospital structure in which any individual having an
emotional or mental condition requiring hospital treatment could feel free
to gain admission without going through such procedures as voluntary com-
mitment. This is in the same sense that one does not commit himself for
the treatment of his acute appendicitis or for his fractured leg. Op-
timally a person should be able to go into a hospital and to leave a hos-
pital upon due notice, regardless of the medical condition.47
Unfortunately the "informal" procedure is seldom used in Illinois-
only .006 percent of admissions to state mental health centers were
"informal" in fiscal year 1972.4 8  The reasons for the infrequent
use of this procedure is that hospital personnel believe that it does
not give them sufficient control over the patient since, under this
procedure, he may leave against their advice if he so desires.49 It
has also been characterized as an "inconvenience" for the hospital
personnel and "an unnecessary allowance" to patients.50
The "voluntary" admission procedure in Illinois is something less
than purely voluntary. In an "informal" admission situation, the
patient agrees to admit himself for treatment and the hospital agrees
to allow him to leave during day time hours if he so desires. In
a "voluntary" admission situation, the patient agrees to admit himself
for treatment and the hospital agrees either to allow him to leave
46. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 322 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (testimony of Dr.
Sherman Kieffer, Director, National Center for Mental Health Services, Training
and Research of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D.C.). See Hearings, id.
at 27 (testimony of Zigmond M. Lebensohn, M.D., Clinical Professor of Psychiatry,
Georgetown University School of Medicine and Chief of the Department of Psy-
chiatry, Sibley Memorial Hospital, representing the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion); Note, District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, 65 COLUM.
L. RaV. 1062 (1965).
47. Hearings, supra note 46, at 116 (testimony of Dr. Leon Yochelson, Chair-
man of the Committee on Mental Health of the District of Columbia Medical
Society). Another witness noted: "I do think that the experience of New
York and Illinois does make it clear to us that informal admission is even better
than so-called voluntary admission, because it is precisely the same kind of admission
which occurs when a patient walks into a hospital for medical observation and
treatment." Hearings, id. at 27 (testimony of Zigmond Lebensohn, M.D.).
48. STATISTICS, supra note 3.
49. Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 432.
50. Id.
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within five working days from the time of his request to leave or
if it is felt that he is still in need of treatment, subsequent to the
request, to seek a court order to involuntarily commit him. The
"voluntary" procedure was utilized in over seventy percent of the
admissions to Illinois state mental hospitals in fiscal year 1972.51
Several problems arise, however, in the context of the "voluntary"
admission. "Voluntary" patients do not always understand that,
should they express a desire to leave, the hospital staff may initiate
involuntary commitment proceedings. This lack of understanding
may be caused by an inadequate explanation of the procedure by
the intake personnel. Another explanation may be that the patient
is too ill to understand the procedure, in which case the appropriate-
ness of such an admission is rendered questionable.52 Regardless
of the reason, an incomplete understanding of the agreement by the
patient will neutralize the therapeutic benefits associated with a "vol-
untary" admission.
Another problem centers around the pressure exerted by the hos-
pital staff on a person to become or remain a "voluntary" patient.
It is not improper to encourage a person to become or continue
as a voluntary patient if the hospital personnel are conviced that
such a person is in need of mental treatment. To bombard the
patient, however, with the advice that he ought to become or remain
"voluntary" and to induce the fear of an involuntary commitment
court hearing as a means of obtaining this end is undue coercion.
Coercion by the hospital staff can range from the overt-making
it difficult to sign a request to leave, to the more subtle-the thera-
pist feigning to take the request to leave personally and being "hurt"
by such a request. This problem is compounded when hospital per-
sonnel wish the patient to remain in the hospital as a "voluntary"
patient because, from their medical viewpoint, he is in need of men-
tal treatment even though the patient should legally be discharged
as not "in need of mental treatment" according to the statute.
Hospital personnel sometimes have an ulterior motive for keeping
the patient "voluntary"; they are not required to perform the inten-
51. STATISTICS, supra note 3.
52. If a patient is too ill to understand the agreement or incompetent, then he is
incapable of agreeing to a "voluntary" admission. There are, however, no guidelines
for intake personnel to follow in order to ascertain whether a patient is capable of
signing an application.
19731
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sive examination necessary to prepare the Physician's Certificate for
an involuntary commitment proceeding. The staff time saved by
not developing and presenting a formal case in court can be devoted
to the treatment of patients. Some hospital staffs also fear going
to court and being questioned about their clinical judgment. These
considerations sometimes lead hospital personnel to go beyond per-
missible bounds in persuading a person to remain as a "voluntary"
patient,
In a 1971 study, it was found that
in a majority of the cases in which voluntary admission procedures were
used, the individuals were already under some form of official custody
and were faced with the threat of involuntary committment proceedings
as the principal alternative to voluntary admission. Neither at the mental
hospital admissions office when persons were brought to that office by the
police, nor in court when persons came before the judge at involuntary
committment hearings, was a serious effort made to adequately inform the
individuals about the choice they were making. 53
The person who chooses a "voluntary" admission in order to avoid
going through the process of involuntary admission gives up all of
the constitutional safeguards required in the later process.5 4  If a
person does not wish to become a patient but becomes one out of
the fear of being committed through the involuntary process, the
therapeutic benefits of the "voluntary" admission may well be lost
to that person while he has been coerced into giving up his constitu-
tional safeguards. It has been suggested that if the patient is fully
informed, he is thus giving up the right to the safeguards of the
involuntary process for "the less restrictive and pejorative status" of
a voluntary patient, a situation which may be roughly analogous
to the plea bargaining process in criminal law. 55 However, where
the decision to become a voluntary patient is based on the fear
of a court hearing and the official record of the testimony induced
by hospital officials, family, friends or police, then the situation be-
comes more like that of a coerced confession. 6 If the voluntary
53. Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 452.
54. See text accompanying notes 57-85, infra for a discussion of these safe-
guards.
55. Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 15, at 450. As authority for this assertion,
the authors cite to Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970).
56. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S.
526 (1963) (confession held inadmissible because induced by police threats of
termination of ADC benefits and loss of custody of the petitioner's child).
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admission is shown to be coerced, then the person may be entitled
to be released. If the hospital personnel wish to detain the patient,
they should be required to do so by using the statutory structure
set up for "involuntary" admissions with all of its procedural safe-
guards.
Involuntary Admissions
There are three procedures established in the Code for the pur-
pose of involuntarily committing persons who are asserted to be in
need of mental treatment: Emergency Admission;17 Admission on
Certificate of a Physician;5" and Petition for Examination and Hear-
ing Upon Court Order.59 In Cook County, the emergency admis-
sion procedure is the one ordinarily used. In the fiscal year 1972,
there were 3,013 cases filed under the emergency procedure and only
342 under the admission on certificate of a physician procedure. 60
Emergency Admission
If a person "is or is asserted to be mentally retarded or in need
of mental treatment and in such a condition that immediate hospi-
talization is necessary for the protection from physical harm of such
person or others," a Petition for Hospitalization0 ' may be presented
to the superintendent stating the reasons for such a conclusion. 2
This Petition must be accompanied by a Physician's Certificate
which is based on an examination by a physician within 72 hours
prior to admission.65 The certificate affirms that the person should
be immediately hospitalized as a person in need of mental treatment
or as a mentally retarded person and states the reasons for this af-
firmance.64 If a physician (or a psychologist if the person is as-
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, §§ 7-1 to -6 (1971).
58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, §§ 6-1 to -6 (1971). This procedure is not to
be confused with the Physician's Certificate, supra note 21, MHC form 4 (1968).
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, §§ 8-1 to 8-8 (1971).
60. Statistics, supra note 3.
61. MHC form 7 (1968).
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91'/2, § 7-1 (1971). The Petition must be executed by
a person who is eighteen years old or older. Id.
63. MHC form 4 (July, 1973).
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 7-1 (1971). The Physician's Certificate has
space for the physician to: (1) state his conclusion as to whether the person is in
need of mental treatment or mentally retarded as defined by the Mental Health Code;
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serted to be mentally retarded) is not immediately available, then
the person may be admitted based upon the Petition alone for a
period not to exceed 24 hours.65 Within 12 hours after the patient's
admission, he must be given a copy of the Petition and a "written
statement in simple, clear and concise terms stating that the patient
will be examined relative to the allegations of the Petition and will
appear before a court for a hearing within 5 working days" after
the court receives notice of the patient's hospitalization. 6  Within
24 hours, the patient must be examined by a psychiatrist. If the
psychiatrist does not certify the patient to be either in need of mental
treatment or mentally retarded, the patient must be released."
Admission on Certificate of a Physician
This procedure differs from the emergency procedure in that an
application 61 instead of a Petition is filed with the Physician's Certif-
cate. The Application for Hospitalization states the facts support-
ing the applicant's belief that the person is in need of mental treat-
ment. Since no emergency exists, the Application for Hospitaliza-
tion contains no allegation that immediate hospitalization is neces-
sary. Within five working days after the Application for Hospitali-
zation and the Certificate have been filed with the court, a judge
of the Circuit Court must meet with the patient, explain his rights
and determine "whether there is reasonable doubt as to whether the
(2) state his conclusion as to whether the person is in need of hospitalization on an
emergency basis because he is likely to physically harm himself or others unless
immediately hospitalized; (3) describe the specific acts upon which he bases his
conclusion; (4) give the place and date of each of these acts; (5) list the witnesses
to each of these acts and their addresses; and (6) list the names and addresses of
his sources of information as to each act. If the information was obtained from a
report or other written document, a copy must be attached. MHC form 4 (July,
1973).
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , §§ 7-2, 7-3 (1971).
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91/, § 7-4 (1971). The patient's attorney and nearest
relative must receive a copy of the Petition and written statement [MHC form 5
(1968)] within 24 hours either in person or by mail. The patient may designate
that these documents be sent to two other persons and the patient may also make
at least two phone calls of his choice upon admission.
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 7-5 (1971).
68. "Application for Hospitalization on Certificate of a Physician," MHC form 3(1968) [hereinafter referred to as the "Application for Hospitalization"]. The Ap-
plication for Hospitalization, unlike the Petition must be executed within 10 days
prior to admission. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 6-1 (1971).
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patient should be detained as in need of mental treatement."' 9 If
the judge so determines or if the patient indicates in any manner
that he desires a hearing, the court shall order a hearing to be held
within five working days.7" The judge may find that there is not
probable cause to continue the hospitalization and may discharge
the patient.7' If the patient does not indicate that he desires a hear-
ing and the judge determines that there is no reasonable doubt as
to the need for detention, the patient will remain hospitalized. At
any time within the next sixty days, the patient may request a hear-
ing.72 Under this procedure, a hearing also must be held on the
written request of "any relative, friend or other interested per-
son." 3 If no hearing is requested during the sixty day period and
the superintendent determines that the patient is in need of contin-
ued hospitalization, he must apply to the court for an order authoriz-
ing continued hospitalization. The patient, his attorney, his nearest
relative, and, at the patient's option, at least two other persons desig-
nated by the patient, must be given written notice of the Application
for Hospitalization which clearly states that the patient will receive
a hearing if a request is made by the patient or someone on the
patient's behalf. If a request is made, the court must set a date
for a hearing within five working days.74
Petition for Examination and Hearing Upon Court Order
Under this procedure, a Petition for Hospitalization is filed with
the court. The court then makes such orders as are necessary to
provide for an examination 7 or a hearing.76 If the Petition is ac-
companied by a Physician's Certificate, the matter is immediately
set for a hearing. If there is no Physician's Certificate, the court
may order an examination. 77  "[T]he person to be examined must
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 912, § 6-4 (1971). The infrequent use of this procedure
in Cook County may be due to the lack of judges available to provide probable
cause hearings at the hospitals.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91Y, § 6-5 (1971).
73. Id. at § 6-6.
74. Id.
75. "Order for Detention and Examination," MHC form 10 (1968).
76. "Order for Hearing," MHC form 8 (1968).
77. At least 36 hours prior to examination, a copy of the petition and order
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be permitted to remain in his home or other place of domicile pend-
ing any examination, and be permitted to be accompanied by one
or more of his relatives or friends to the place of examination" unless
the court finds it necessary to order the person admitted to the hos-
pital pending such examination. s In the later situation, the court
could order a sheriff, police officer or other person to transport the
person to a hospital.7 9  The person cannot be held longer than 24
hours for purposes of examination and "shall" be released earlier
if the examination is complete.80
If the examining physician executes a Physician's Certificate,
however, stating that the person is in need of mental treatment or
mentally retarded, a hospital may admit the person and the matter
is set for a hearing. When the court orders a hearing, notice of
the time and place must be given to the patient, his attorney and
the patient's two nearest relatives at least 48 hours prior to the hear-
ing.8' The person "must be permitted to remain in his home or other
place of domicile pending any hearing" unless the courts find hos-
pitalization necessary."'" The hearing must be scheduled within five
working days after receipt of the Petition and Certificate.81
The Mental Health Code provides that once a hearing for involun-
tary commitment is scheduled, the patient may request, at any time
prior to the court's finding that he is in need of mental treatment,
to be admitted as an "informal" or "voluntary" patient, at which
time the court will dismiss the pending petition. 84 Since the hospital
staff and administrators do not favor "informal" admissions and the
Department of Mental Health acquiesces in this practice, the effec-
tiveness of this option is greatly diminished. If the proceedings
have been instituted by a petition for emergency admission or a peti-
tion for examination and hearing upon a court order, "the court may
for examination must be delivered to the person, his attorney and his two nearest
relatives. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 !2, § 8-6 (1971).
78. Id. at § 8-5.
79. "Writ for Detention, Examination and Appearance Before a Court," MHC
form 11 (1968).
80. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91%, § 8-5 (1971).
81. Id. at § 8-7.
82. Id.
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/, § 8-8 (1971).
84. Id. at § 3-5.
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require proof that such dismissal is in the best interest of that person
and the public.""5  Generally, the court will want to hear the opin-
ion of the physician concerning the advisability of "voluntary" ad-
mission. The physician will normally recommend that the patient
be allowed to admit himself on a "voluntary" basis if the person
recognizes that he has a problem and wishes to remain in the hos-
pital for treatment. If the physician feels that the person will im-
mediately sign a request to leave or if the person has a history
of frequent unauthorized absences, he will probably not recommend
that the person be admitted on a "voluntary" basis.
THE HEARING
Role of Counsel
The patient has a right to counsel at the hearing and, if he is
indigent, to the appointment of a public defender., If no public
defender is available, the court must appoint counsel who will be
paid a statutory fee.8 "Counsel shall be allowed time for adequate
preparation and shall not be prevented from conferring with the per-
son at reasonable times nor from making such reasonable investiga-
tion of the matters in issue and presenting such relevant evidence
at such hearing as he believes is necessary to a proper disposition
of the proceedings. 8 7  The attorney for the patient should prepare
for the hearing by interviewing the patient and examining his hos-
pital records. He should also interview the patient's therapist, physi-
cian, relatives, family and any other witnesses to any of the incidents
which are relevant to the hearing.88 Examination of the chart of
the patient is essential, however, the patient's consent should be ob-
tained in writing and presented to the ward staff when requesting
85. Id.
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 9-4 (1971). The patient has a constitutional
right to counsel. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968). In
Cook County, "the majority of the people subjected to commitment proceedings are
the poor." Schneider, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 58 A.B.A.J. 1059,
1061 (1972).
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 9 1 /2, § 9-4 (1971).
88. Since the proceeding is conducted in accordance with the Civil Practice Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 13-1 (1971), the attorney for the patient has discovery
methods available to him. However, since a hearing will be conducted in two to
four days, he will have to choose between a continuance in order to utilize discovery
procedures and a speedy hearing.
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the charta9 Particularly helpful is the comprehensive treatment plan
which should be found at the beginning of the program notes.90
This plan should give the attorney an overall view of the patient's
situation. The intake reports will state the circumstances under
which the patient was admitted to the hospital.9 1 The daily progress
notes will indicate how the patient has been doing since his admis-
sion. The results of the physical examination should be reviewed
and the doctor should be asked if any physical problem could be
responsible for the patient's mental condition. If the patient is
drowsy or complains about the medication, the prescription and the
amount of medication administered should be checked. Medication
sometimes may cause such physical symptoms as restlessness and
nervousness. The Petition, Physician's Certificate, intake reports
and criminal complaints will contain the names of potential wit-
nesses. It is also important for counsel to determine, where criminal
charges are pending, whether the patient has posted bond, since a
discharge at the hearing will, in the absence of bond or some substi-
tute, mean he will be sent to the County Jail.
The attorney should also explore the possibility of treatment short
of hospitalization. There is always the possibility of negotiating a
compromise for the patient. The physician may agree on outpatient
treatment as a viable alternative if he could be convinced that the
patient would take his medication. If it can be demonstrated to
the physician that the patient has made realistic post-discharge plans
and that he is not returning to the situation which caused the hos-
pitalization, he may recommend the discharge of the patient. The
physician and therapist will be concerned about such factors as
whether the patient has a place to stay, if he has sufficient funds,
whether he is going to school or if he has a good opportunity to
obtain a job. The attorney may wish to advise the patient on these
matters.
Counsel should explain to the patient his rights and discuss the
89. Consent is required because the patient's records and reports are confiden-
tial. Ill. Dep't of Mental Health, Rule 5.01 (1970) [hereinafter cited as "DMH"].
The Code has been amended to allow the patient as well as the attorney to examine
these records. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91Y2, § 12-3 (Supp. 1973).
90. See note 28, supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 18-26, Admission to -a Hospital, supra.
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possibility of a "voluntary" admission as well as the consequences
of involuntary commitment. It is also important for the patient to
understand the reasons that the psychiatrist and therapist may have
for favoring involuntary commitment. If, after a full discussion,
the patient wishes to remain outside the hospital, the attorney should
advocate that position to the fullest extent. Counsel may offer his
opinion and suggest alternatives, but once the patient decides to op-
pose hospitalization, counsel has the responsibility to fully represent
his client's interests as the patient perceives them, not as the attorney
judges them to be.92  As the Supreme Court said in regard to a
defense attorney's responsibilities on a criminal appeal, "The consti-
tutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only
be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in
behalf of his client, as opposed to that of an amicus curiae."9
There are other views on the role the attorney should play in an
involuntary commitment hearing.94 One author has stated:
It is not adequate to have a public attorney or a public defender appear
merely at the court hearings. From our observations, this type of legal
representation proves ineffectual in practice. I feel that the patient needs
a much different type of representation. He needs someone to "listen to
his case"; someone who can give him advice about the legal consequences
of hospitalization. The task of the lawyer would not be to "get the pa-
tient off" wherever possible. Instead, he would objectively weigh the
medical, social and legal aspects of the proposed commitment, and then
advise and assist the patient accordingly. Lawyers are accustomed to per-
forming this type of counseling service, and they can be very effective at
it. I am sure that, in most cases, the attorney would advise the patient
that hospitalization will be the best thing for him.95
92. An attorney who defends patients, when asked whether the role of counsel
should be more like that of guardian ad litem than that of a defense counsel, stated:
Basically I resolve it in my own mind on a case-by-case basis. I try to be
a "counsel" but also I try to arrive at an understanding of my patients'
problems. If it appears he needs help, I try to persuade him into staying.
However, when the patient absolutely insists on seeking release, I feel that
I have to assist him all the way to that end.
Hearings, supra note 46, at 187 (testimony of David Addlestone, Staff Attorney,
District of Columbia Legal Aid Agency).
93. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
94. See generally Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment
of the Mentally Ill, 44 TExAs L. REV. 424 (1966).
95. R. JANOPAUL, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALIZING THE MENTALLY ILL 13-14 (Amer-
ican Bar Foundation Research Memorandum, Series No. 31, 1962), cited in Cohen,
supra note 94, at 446 n.101.
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The Right to a Jury, to be Present at the Hearing, and
the Statutory Standard
The Code provides that the hearing "shall be conducted in accord-
ance with the 'Civil Practice Act.' ,9 A person who is claimed
to be either in need of mental treatment or mentally retarded has
a right to a jury trial.9 T  Generally, a jury trial is not a good strat-
egy as any instability or peculiarity could be easily elicited from
a patient who could not withstand a tough cross-examination by a
competent State's Attorney. The more peculiar the conduct of the
patient, the more likely it is that the jury will feel that he should
be in the hospital, even though the patient may not be dangerous
to himself or others and is able to care for himself. The court will
generally give cautionary instructions as to the jurors' role in the
administration of justice in such a proceeding.98 Then the jurors
will receive basic instructions on their obligation to consider all of
the evidence,99 their right to consider the evidence in light of per-
sonal observation and experience, 1 0 and their duty, as "the sole
judges of the credibility of the witnesses," to determine the truthful-
ness of the testimony.' Finally, the court will instruct the jury
as to the burden of proof "in terms of what is more probably true
than not true"'1 2 and specifically as to the burden of proof on the
factual issue:
The State has the burden of proving each of the following proposi-
tions:
First, that the Respondent is afflicted with a mental disorder;
Second, that the Respondent, as a result of such a mental disorder, is
reasonably expected now or within a reasonable time hereafter to (a)
intentionally or unintentionally physically injure himself, (b) intention-
ally or unintentionally physically injure other persons or (c) is unable to
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 13-1 (1971).
97. A jury of six is to be chosen in the same manner as in other civil proceedings.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 9-2 (1971). This right should be discussed at the
interview with the patient so that an intelligent decision can be made prior to the
hearing.
98. ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2d, § 1.01 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as IPI 2d].
99. IPI 2d, supra note 98 at § 1.02.
100. IPI 2d, supra note 98 at § 1.04.
101. IPI 2d, supra note 98 at § 2.01.
102. IPI 2d, supra note 98 at § 21.01.
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care for himself so as to guard himself from physical injury or to provide
for his own physical needs.' 0 3
The defense attorney may wish to draft other instructions to fit
his particular factual situation-that the medication is influencing
the appearance of the patient or that a physical problem may be
causing or affecting his mental condition. The patient must be pres-
ent at the hearing "unless the attorney for the patient waives the
patient's presence and the court is satisfied by a clear and positive
showing that the attendance of the patient would cause a serious
risk of physical or emotional injury to him, in which circumstance
the judge, or the jury, if there is a jury, shall personally observe
and confer with the patient."'1 4
The definition of "in need of mental treatment" requires that the
person be afflicted with a mental disorder. However, textbooks on
psychiatry discuss a great number of mental states referred to as
disorders.0 5 The statutory definition specifically excludes persons
whose mental processes have "merely been weakened or impaired
by reason of advanced years." 106  It does not require that there
be evidence of recent overt acts of physical violence or threats di-
rected by the patient towards himself or others. It requires only
a reasonable expectation "at the time of the determination or within
a reasonable time thereafter that the respondent will intentionally
103. This is adapted from the statutory definition of a person in need of mental
treatment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/, § 1-11 (Supp. 1972). See text accompanying
note 4, supra.
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91/2, § 9-4 (1971). Sometimes a relative or friend
wishes to exclude the patient from the courtroom so as not to jeopardize his rela-
tionship with the patient. While a relationship may be jeopardized, if the testimony
does not threaten any injury to the patient, the exclusion should not be allowed
because the patient is often the only person who can refute or explain facts testified
to by the witness. In Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis.
1972), the court said that attendance at the hearing by the detained party could
not be waived.
105. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (1969).
106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 1-11 (Supp. 1972).
When a person of advanced years is presented for admission, the hospital
must ensure that a comprehensive physical and mental examination is per-
formed along with a study of his family and community situation. This
data will be used "to determine whether some program other than hos-
pitalization will meet the needs of such person with preference being given
to care or treatment in his home community."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 3-7 (1971).
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or unintentionally injure himself or others or be unable to care for
himself."' 7
The Witness
The first witness called by the state in commitment-related pro-
ceedings in the Circuit Court of Cook County is usually the certify-
ing physician'1 who is an employee of the Department of Mental
Health. The majority of such physicians are practicing under a State
Hospital Permit or Temporary Certificate of Registration due to
their inability to pass the examination enabling a physician to prac-
tice medicine in all its branches as required by Illinois and other
states. The permits and certificates are issued pursuant to the Medi-
cal Practice Act."°9 Section 14(a) of this Act was amended in 1972
to provide that all such permits were to expire on July 1, 1973.
As a condition to renewal, "the permit holder shall be required to
show proof of having passed an examination given by the Depart-
ment of Registration and Education or to have passed an examina-
tion deemed by the Department to have been at least equal in all
substantial respects to the Department's examination."'10 This
amendment was challenged by a group of physicians employed by
the Department of Mental Health as unconstitutional because it
would deprive the physicians of their licenses to practice medicine,
and thus their jobs, without due process."' In denying the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss in In re Rios, the court said:
It is clear that the State of Illinois has extended tenure to the plaintiffs to
practice medicine within the standards of their limited licenses. The State
cannot now add arbitrary requirements to their licenses. Nor does this
threaten the patients, as Amicus suggests. If, at any time, the State finds
a doctor unqualified to practice under a limited license, the Civil Service
laws provide for the doctor's removal in accordance with due process guar-
antees. While Amicus argues correctly that the mentally ill patients of
this State are entitled to qualified doctors, it is also the law that doctors
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 1-11 (Supp. 1972).
108. " 'Physician' means any person licensed by the State of Illinois to practice
medicine in all its branches, and includes any person holding a State Hospital
Permit or Temporary Certificate of Registration, as provided in the Medical Practice
Act." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91Y2, § 1-14 (1971).
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, §§ I to 18 (1971).
110. Id. at § 14(a) (Supp. 1972).
111. In re Rios, No. 72 CH 6076 (Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty., Ill., filed Oct. 24,
1972).
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who have qualified to serve these patients are entitled to due process
protections of their employment. 112
The Court has yet to reach the question of whether the statute was
unconstitutional.
Normally, the physician will also be a psychiatrist-defined under
the Code as one who has devoted "a substantial portion of his time
to the practice of psychiatry and has practiced psychiatry for one
year immediately preceeding the Certification of any patient.""' 3
The testimony of the physician or psychiatrist is crucial." 4  This
witness will describe the mental disorder of the patient in medical
terms"S-that the patient is paranoid or schizophrenic-and may
explain that the patient has delusions, hallucinates, is not oriented
as to time and space, or lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make
a responsible decision. Generally, the physician will testify as to
what the patient told him in the interview about the circumstances
surrounding his admission to the hospital."' This may involve an
incident which prompted the family or friends to bring the person
to the hospital-beating a family member, attempting suicide, re-
fusing to eat or work or destroying property-or an incident with the
police that resulted in the admission such as, wandering in the middle
of the street shouting or in a daze, or acting out in a public place.
The physician will then give his or her opinion as to whether
the patient is suffering from a mental disorder and if so, whether
the patient, as a result of this disorder, will be dangerous or unable
to care for himself at that time or a reasonable time thereafter.
If the patient is alleged to be mentally retarded, the witness will
testify as to the psychological evaluation of the person which in-
cludes his social age, IQ and whether the person is educable, train-
able and either severely or profoundly mentally retarded. 1 7  The
112. Id. Memorandum Opinion and Ruling on Motion to Dismiss at 10
(Sept. 27, 1973).
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 1-15 (1971).
114. "No person may be found to be in need of mental treatment unless at least
one psychiatrist or physician [or psychologist in case of mental retardation] who has
personally examined the respondent so testifies in person at the hearing . I." ld.
at § 9-4.
115. Id.
116. See AMERICAN PsYCHIATIuc ASSOCIATION, DIAONOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MAN-
UAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (1969).
117. The Code defines mental retardation as "subaverage general intellectual
functioning generally originating during the developmental period and is associated
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testimony will also include an assessment of his potential develop-
ment and a recommendation as to an appropriate placement, such
as discharge, hospitalization, out-patient treatment, or release into
the custody of a family. He may also give a prognosis as to how
long the patient may have to be treated.
On cross examination,"" the defense attorney should ask whether
the physician had warned the patient that the information obtained
in the interview might be repeated in an in-court involuntary com-
mitment proceeding."' The physician should be asked to translate
his diagnosis into lay terms and describe the symptoms which sup-
port his diagnosis. He should also be asked to explain how the
mental disorder would cause the patient to be a danger to himself
or others or render him unable to care for himself, since neither
of these conditions necessarily follow from the fact that a person
is suffering from delusions or hallucinations. 120  It is difficult to
with impairment in adaptive behavior. Impaired adaptive behavior may be reflected
in delayed maturation or reduced learning ability or inadequate social adjustment."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 1-12 (1971).
The majority of mentally retarded persons fall into the "educable" group. Their
IQ. score is approximately 55 to 69. "If allowed to learn at their own pace,
with teachers who understand their limitations, they can be taught social and voca-
tional skills, and can earn their living in simple jobs. They may marry; and they
may have normal children." F. OGG, SECURING THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF RETARDED
CHILDREN (Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 492) at 3 (1973). A person falling into
this category should not be involuntarily admitted to a mental hospital.
Almost six percent fall into the "trainable" or moderate category where I.Q.s
range from 40 to 54, "While they cannot go much beyond second grade in academic
subjects, they can be trained in manual skills. They can hold jobs too but they
need living arrangements that give them some supervision. . . . Only 5 percent are
either 'severely' retarded, with IQs from 25 to 39, or 'profoundly' retarded, with
IQs below 25. They require constant care." Id.
118. See Ennis, Trial Techniques, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 283 (B.
Ennis ed. 1973); J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTI-
MONY (1970).
119. See text accompanying notes 184-88, infra. "There is no privilege . ..
for any relevant communications . .. if the judge finds that the patient, after having
been informed that the communications would not be privileged, has made communi-
cations to a psychiatrist in the course of a psychiatric examination ordered by the
court, provided that such communications shall be admissible only with respect to
issues involving the patient's mental condition ....... ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51,
§ 5.2 (1971). Whether the lack of warning should be raised in an objection
to the foundation laid for the testimony or on a motion to strike is not clear.
It has been raised in both ways. If raised on an objection to the foundation, the
court will not hear the testimony if the State's Attorney does not bring out the
warning on direct examination. However, defense counsel may indirectly bring out
on cross examination that no such warning was ever given and then move to strike.
120. Texts and publication of authorities on mental disorders may be used to
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assert that the patient may be a danger to himself in the future
when there is no evidence that he ever inflicted or attempted or
threatened to inflict harm either on himself or another person.
Judge Joseph Schneider has commented on this difficulty:
First, let us examine the "dangerous to others" category. Since many of
the persons who fall into this category may not have inflicted harm on
anyone, we are predicting that they are likely to cause harm in the fu-
ture. . . . If society is to allow the involuntary hospitalization of the men-
tally ill on the prediction of certain harmful conduct in the future, then
we must strive for more precise criteria. At this point we must define
the category or kinds of harm that justify society's intervention. Should
we expect the harm to be serious bodily injury, such as murder, rape or
aggravated battery? What if the bodily injury is of a more minor nature,
such as a punch or a slap? Should that be enough to commit?
Some people have proposed that psychological harm or anticipated psy-
chological harm to others should justify commitment. They speak of the
damage from exhibitionism or of neglect of children by a mentally ill
parent. What if the anticipated harm is only against property, such as
breaking windows or shoplifting?
What degree of certainty is the prediction of harm? Some studies show
that psychiatrists err in the over prediction of dangerousness. The solu-
tion is not to abandon the contribution that psychiatry can make to the
court process but [to understand] that law and psychiatry must learn to
ask and answers the kinds of questions posed earlier. Perhaps we [were]
asking too much of psychiatry when we asked for predictions of this
kind. 121
When one considers that a large number of the psychiatrists who
testify hold temporary licenses to practice medicine, have been un-
able to pass their medical boards, have no formal training in psychia-
try, and often disagree on the definition of fundamental terms, the
possibility of their predicting "dangerousness" with any accuracy is
decreased substantially.122
The physician should be asked how the physical condition of
the patient may affect his mental behavior123 and whether the med-
rebut the testimony of the psychiatrist. The patient's chart may also be used to
impeach the witness. Flynn v. Troesch, 373 111. 275, 26 N.E.2d 91 (1940);
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965); Esderts v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co., 76 Ill. App. 2d
210, 222 N.E.2d 117 (1966).
121. Schneider, supra note 86, at 1060.
122. The author has had a psychiatrist testify on cross examination that it was
difficult for him to understand the life style of "a poor, black youth from the south
side of Chicago." This increases the likelihood of error in prediction.
123. The attorney should examine the patient's chart for the results of his physi-
cal examination. See note 28, supra.
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ication may account for any of his symptoms. 124 The physician
should also be asked whether alternative means of treatment, such
as releasing the patient into the custody of a family member or out-
patient care, are viable possibilities. 125  If the physician insists that
hospitalization is the only alternative, then the attorney may wish
to explore the physician's expectations of the type of treatment the
patient will receive at the hospital.
The therapist or social worker assigned to the patient by the hos-
pital usually testifies as to the patient's record of past hospitaliza-
tions, statements made by the patient in conversations which may
include the patient's explanation of how his admission came about,
and finally, as to the patient's behavior as observed on the ward.
This may involve a description of the patient as withdrawn or ag-
gressive towards other patients. The testimony may also include the
attempts at or threats of suicide.1 26  The therapist is not permitted,
however, to give an opinion unless he or she is qualified by holding
a degree in psychiatric social work.
It may be appropriate here to mention a problem which arises
from this interaction between the legal and medical communities at
the hearing. When it is the hospital personnel who initiate the in-
voluntary proceedings, for example, in order to keep a "voluntary"
patient who wishes to be discharged, a great deal of damage may be
124. The attorney also should examine the patient's chart to determine the type
and amount of medication administered. See note 28, supra.
125. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91/2, § 9-6 (1971). "If any person is finally found to
be in need of mental treatment or mentally retarded, the court, as part of the hearing
shall consider the alternative forms of care or treatment which are desirable for and
available to the patient, including but not limited to hospitalization." Id. The
least restrictive alternative doctrine was applied in Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657
(D.C. Cir. 1966). For a general discussion, see Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine
of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964); Chambers, Alternatives
to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional
Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972) (a discussion not only of the legal obli-
gations of the physician or psychiatrist to search for alternatives but also an outline
of the practicalities of such a search).
126. The psychiatrist as a witness in a civil commitment case is necessary,
but he is not the only witness who has an important contribution to make.
Objective testing by a skilled psychologist can give insights and depth to the
understanding of the person. The same is true of the competent social
worker, who can give the court a fuller picture of the life experiences of
the person, his strengths as well as weaknesses. These disciplines can assist
the court when their contribution can withstand denigration in a contested
situation.
Schneider, supra note 86 at 1060.
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done to the relationship between the patient and the psychiatrist or
therapist. This occurs because the psychiatrist and therapist must
testify in court that the defendant is either dangerous or unable to care
for himself in rather particular terms. In order to avoid this con-
frontation, hospital personnel often encourage the family, relatives
or friends of the patient to take the responsibility for initiating the
procedure by signing the petition for hospitalization. However, even
in this situation, the psychiatrist and therapist generally testify at
the hearing. 127  This raises the question of whether a patient's right
to treatment is compromised when he is involuntarily committed by
the persons responsible for his treatment in light of the disrupted
relationship which the courtroom confrontation often causes. 28
Other witnesses may include the patient's family, relatives, or
friends who would be able to testify as to incidents leading up to
the patient's admission to the hospital. Such witnesses may have
called the police because of physical violence by the patient or may
testify that the patient cannot safely go outside because he wanders
in traffic or fails to eat or take care of his other physical needs.' 29
The state may call the patient as a witness under section 60 of the
Civil Practice Act.'30 However, the patient may refuse to answer
questions that would tend to incriminate him.' 3 ' At the end of the
127. It may be argued that since the basic forms of treatment are group ther-
apy and chemotherapy, it is unlikely that the therapeutic relationship is en-
dangered by an involuntary commitment.
128. For a discussion of an involuntary patient's right to treatment see text
accompanying notes 196-209, infra.
129. Predictability of future conduct can be more accurate when the court
has available testimony of witnesses as to the pattern of conduct exhibited
by the person prior to the initiation of the commitment proceeding. Testi-
mony of family members, neighbors, friends, employees and others who
have personal knowledge of the person can give substance to the decision
making on the part of the judge. What was the motivation behind the
initiating of the commitment procedure? Was the fear of danger by the
person or to the person realistic? Was the threshold of tolerance of the
community of the behavior of the respondent so low that the allegations are
overpredictions of danger? What social, cultural and emotional factors led
to the use of the court in an attempt to solve this problem? The court is
constantly struggling to answer this question and it needs help. Much re-
search is necessary to help understand and to develop more reliable means
of predicting dangerous behavior.
Schneider, supra note 86 at 1060-61.
130. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 60 (1971). See People ex rel. Keith v. Keith,
38 Ill. 2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 387 (1967).
131. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Cf. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1967)
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
state's case, the defense attorney should always move for a directed
verdict,
The defense will generally have the patient testify in order to over-
come the main thrust of the state's case. If the state has maintained
that the patient is unable to care for himself, the patient may testify
that he can care for himself and explain how he will go about it.
The patient may wish to explain his future plans for employment
and living arrangements. If there is evidence of an overt threat
or act of violence, the respondent may wish to refute that evidence
by delving into relevant mitigating circumstances.
The defense may also call a psychiatrist as a defense witness to
counter the testimony of the state as to the patient's mental disorder.
If the patient is indigent, he has the right to the services of an expert
witness.' 32
Constitutional Safeguards
Since, in an involuntary commitment proceeding, the state seeks
to deprive the patient of his liberty, said proceeding must comply
with the requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution 3' and the comparable section of the Illinois Con-
stitution.'34 In a recent decision, Lessard v. Schmidt,' a three
judge federal court invalidated the Wisconsin mental health code
and required stringent safeguards for persons faced with involuntary
commitment.
The court rejected the argument that due process requirements
should be relaxed due to the fact that involuntary incarceration car-
ries with it a constitutional right to treatment for basically the same
reasons that the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United
States"'36 refused to relax due process standards in juvenile proceed-
ings. That argument, the Lessard court said, "ignores the fact that
(extending Miranda to a tax investigation "where no criminal proceeding might even
be brought .. ").
132. People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966).
133. "No State shall . . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
134. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law .. " ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
135. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Lessard].
136. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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unless constitutionally prescribed procedural due process require-
ments for involuntary commitment are met, no person should be
subjected to 'treatment' against his will."'137 The argument also ig-
mores the fact that many mental illnesses are untreatable, as well
as the fact that there is "substantial evidence that any lengthy hospi-
talization, particularly where it is involuntary, may greatly increase
the symptoms of mental illness and make adjustments to society
more difficult."' 38
The argument that the proceeding is civil and not criminal and
therefore that the due process requirements should be relaxed was
also rejected, having been laid to rest, the court said, by the Supreme
Court's decision in In re Gault.'39 "Even a brief examination of
the effects of civil commitment upon those adjudged mentally ill
shows the importance of strict adherence to stringent procedural re-
quirements and the necessity for narrow, precise standards."' 40
Among these effects are the deprivation of civil rights, "the difficul-
ties that the committed individual will face in attempting to adjust
to life outside the institution following release" and perhaps the most
serious, "the statistics which indicate that an individual committed
to a mental institution has a much greater chance of dying than
if he were left at large."' 14 '
The court held that due process requires that a person may not
be detained longer than forty-eight hours without a preliminary hear-
ing and that a full hearing must be held within ten to fourteen days
of that hearing. 42 Notice of the scheduled hearing must be given
far enough in advance to afford a "reasonable opportunity to pre-
pare" for the hearing and such notice "must set forth the basis for
detention with particularity."'143  A person detained on grounds of
mental illness has a right to counsel and, if indigent, to appointed
counsel.' 44 A person also has the right not to speak to a psychiatrist
and must be given notice of the fact that his statements may be
137. 349 F. Supp. at 1087.
138. Id.
139. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
140. 349 F. Supp. at 1088.
141. Id. at 1089.
142. Id. at 1091-92.
143. Id. at 1092.
144. Id. at 1097.
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used to incriminate him in the eyes of the psychiatrist and the trier
of fact in a civil commitment proceeding. Before commitment, it
must be shown that the patient was so notified. 145  Also, hearsay
evidence is not admissible in a civil commitment proceeding. 14
It is important to note that the court in Lessard stated that due
process requires that the standard of proof be beyond a reasonable
doubt and that "there is an extreme likelihood that if the person
is not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or others.' 14
This conclusion of dangerousness must be "based upon a finding
of a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to
oneself or another."'148  Even upon a finding that the person is in
need of mental treatment, full-time involuntary hospitalization
should be ordered only as a last resort. 49
Due Process Issues in Illinois
Currently there are many due process issues in Illinois similar to
those raised in Lessard.
Notice Requirements
Under the procedure for admission on a certificate of a physician,
the Application for Hospitalization and the Certificate "must state
in reasonable detail the basis for the belief of the persons executing
them that the person whose hospitalization is desired is in need of
mental treatment."' 50  Under the emergency admission procedure,
the Petition must state reasons for the conclusion that a person is
"in such a condition that immediate hospitalization is necessary for
the protection from physical harm of such person or others ... "I"
In addition, the Petition must state "the names of the witnesses by
which the facts asserted may be proved.' 1 52  Most Petitions filed
145. Id. at 1101.
146. ld. at 1102-03.
147. Id. at 1093.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1095.
150. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91Y2, § 6-1 (1971); MHC form 5 (1968).
151. ILL.. REV. STAT. ch. 91Y2, § 7-1 (1971).
152. Id.
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in Cook County do not meet the notice requirements of the Code.'
In Lessard the court held that due process required reasonable
notice of the hearing in order to afford a reasonable opportunity
for preparation by the patient:
Notice of date, time and place is not satisfactory. The patient should be
informed of the basis for his detention, his right to jury trial, the standard
upon which he may be detained, the names of examining physicians and
all other persons who may testify in favor of his continued detention,
and the substance of their proposed testimony.'
54
The only notice which the patient receives prior to the hearing is
a copy of the Petition along with a written statement that he "will
be examined relative to the allegations of the petition and will appear
before a court for a hearing within 5 days. . -.Il In the recently
litigated Illinois case, United States ex rel. Matthew v. Glass,'58 the
issue of adequate notice was raised and then dismissed by agreement
because "[t]he Department of Mental Health has agreed to adopt
regulations and forms requiring the petition for involuntary hospital-
ization to set forth act or acts of the respondent which lead the
petitioner to believe the respondent to be in need of mental treat-
ment.1
57
Detention Without a Timely Hearing
Under the involuntary procedures in Illinois a person may not
get a hearing for five to seven days after admission.15 8  In Lessard,
the court stated that "no significant deprivation of liberty can be
justified without a prior hearing on the necessity of the detention."' 5 9
While the state may wish to detain persons on an emergency basis
because they are a danger to themselves or others, such a detention
153. See REPORT TO THE BOARD MANAGERS OF THE CHICAGO BAR AssOcIATION
FROM THE MENTAL HEALTH COMMrrrrE 1 (June, 1973) (where the Mental Health
Committee recommended "[tihat petitions filed pursuant to the Mental Health
Code must be supported by a statement of facts, and not be merely conclusions,
such as 'He is dangerous'").
154. 349 F. Supp. at 1092.
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 7-4 (1971); MHC form 5 (1968).
156. Nos. 72 C 2104, 72 C 1979 (D.C. N.D. Ill., filed Aug. 23, 1972).
157. Id., Motion to Dismiss Certain Issues and to File Amended Complaint
(granted Oct. 25, 1972). The revised Physician's Certificate requires much more
information. See note 64, supra.
158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, §§ 6-4, 7-6 (1971).
159. 349 F. Supp. at 1091.
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can be justified only for the time necessary to arrange a hearing
before a non-partisan judge. "[T]he maximum period which a per-
son may be detained without a preliminary hearing is 48 hours. It
must be remembered that at this time the necessity for commitment
of an individual has not yet been established."'' 60 In United States
ex rel. Matthew v. Glass, the plaintiffs argued that a probable cause
hearing must be held within forty-eight hours as required by Lessard.
The issue was settled by a stipulation and all persons detained as
in need of mental treatment will be given a hearing within two to
four days after admission.' 6"
Standard of Proof: Preponderance of the Evidence as Violative of
Due Process
Article XIII of the Code' 0 2 provides that the hearing is civil in
nature. That provision propounds the relevant standard of proof:
preponderance of the evidence. In Lessard the court said that "[c]ivil
commitment cannot . . . be justified upon a mere preponderance
160. Id. In Logan v. Aradeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D.C. Conn. 1972), the emer-
gency procedure in Connecticut allowing 45 days of hospitalization without a
hearing was held not to violate due process. The court reasoned:
There is a compensating advantage to the committed person because in
many cases during this period the medical staff at the hospital can ade-
quately alleviate his mental illness or by use of non-emergency diagnostic
procedures determine that he is not a 'danger to himself or others.' In
such cases, the stigma of court record is avoided and the length of con-
finement is shortened. It must be remembered that commitment has not
been undertaken for the sake of penal detention. The patient is committed
for treatment and care, and some knowledge of his mental condition can be
gained by visual observation and diagnostic tests. This takes time . . .
where a full blown court trial must be had . . . additional time to
undertake more elaborate testing of the patient's mental condition, and
a more detailed probe into his relevant history, by both the hospital au-
thorities and the expert witnesses who will testify in behalf of the patient is
needed.
Id. at 1269.
This opinion failed to take into consideration the patient who would have been
released upon a hearing to establish probable cause and is contrary to the holding in
Lessard. The Logan court notes that the remedy of a writ of habeus corpus is
available. However, there are many obstacles to the use of this remedy by persons
held in a mental hospital. Also, the availability of this remedy does not save a
constitutionally defective statute, see Fhagen v. Miller, 306 F. Supp. 634, 638 (S.D.
N.Y. 1969).
161. United States ex rel. Matthew v. Glass, Nos. 72 C 2104, 72 C 1979 (D.C.
N.D. Ill., filed Aug. 23, 1972), Motion to Dismiss Certain Issues and to File
Amended Complaint at 3.
162. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91%, § 13-1 (1971).
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of the evidence," ' 163 citing Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service"" where the United States Supreme Court said that, in a
deportation case, a person could not be "banished from this country
upon no higher degree of proof than applies in a negligence case."'16
The court in Lessard concluded that a civil commitment involved
a greater loss of freedom than that in deportation and required that
the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" be applied, citing In
re Winship. 66 There, in the words of the court in Lessard, the
Supreme Court held that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required to prove every fact neces-
sary in juvenile delinquency proceedings, noting that 'extreme caution in
fact finding' . . . is necessary because of 'the possibility that [the indi-
vidual] may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty
that he would be stigmatized by the conviction!' 167
The court also cited In re Gault for the proposition that "civil labels
and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal
due process safeguards,"' 68 reasoning that the higher standard was
even more compelling in a civil commitment because the individual
is deprived of basic civil rights and would certainly be "stigmatized
by the lack of confidentiality of the adjudication."'6 9
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held, in
In re Balley, 70 that due process requires a standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt. In examining the reasons behind the varying
standards, the court in Bailey stated:
The process accorded in any adversary proceeding reflects the interests at
stake. In the present case the paramount interest is liberty, since the in-
dividual who is civilly committed faces restrictions which may exceed in
length those imposed in most circumstances on the criminal or juvenile de-
linquent. Our deliberation therefore focuses on competing interests in an
attempt to determine whether any may offset the immense individual in-
terests involved. Focusing precisely on the state interest is a difficult task,
however, because the statutes which address the enormous problem of
mental illness broadly reflect dual motives, each of which may permit or
require distinct procedures if considered separately. The first and dom-
163. 349 F. Supp. at 1094.
164. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
165. Id. at 284.
166. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
167. 349 F. Supp. at 1095.
168. 397 U.S. at 365-66.
169. 349 F. Supp. at 1095.
170. 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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inant objective involves society's concern with antisocial conduct. This
leads inexorably to analogy with the criminal system, not only because
there are certain similarities in objective but primarily because the result-
ing restriction of liberty has assumed a significant and visible role in the
creation of inhibitions to the state's overzealous or mistaken application
of that power. On virtually every plane of comparison the civil model
presents an equally compelling plea for a stringent burden of proof.
Inextricably intertwined in both the statute and its legislative history is a
second state interest involving its role as parens patriae. While viscerally
a more persuasive rationale in terms of offsetting the individual's loss of
liberty, the argument largely dissolves upon closer inspection. No dis-
tinction is made between the statutory standards permitting instiutionaliza-
tion where dangerous to society and where dangerous to self in terms of
the individual or in terms of the differing process which distinct interests
may require. Moreover, the latter standard itself sweeps in varied and
complex classes who represent different interests and it also presents equally
perplexing definitional problems. Recognizing again the immense individ-
ual interests involved, it is questionable whether a rather significant mar-
gin of error should be tolerated regardless of the rationale, particularly
since a more demanding burden of proof is by its nature largely neutral
in its affect on relevant state policies. It is more appropriately charac-
terized as a particularly suitable means of reducing the risk of factual er-
rors which may be engendered by the statute or by the difficulties inherent
in the disciplines associated with mental illness. Finally, we cannot help
but recognize the stigma which unfortunately still accompanies a finding
of mental illness.
'Stone walls do not a prison make, nor iron bars a cage.' We align our-
selves with those courts that have held that proof of mental illness and
dangerousness in involuntarily civil commitment proceedings must be be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 171
In United States ex rel. Matthew v. Glass, 1 72 the issue of standard
of proof was raised but dismissed by stipulation because, all of the
proceedings where held before a judge and thus it was not clear
which standard had been applied.
The Statutory Standard
According to the court in Lessard, the statutory standard to be
met in determining if a person is in need of mental treatment is
not satisfied if it is predicted that the person is dangerous to himself
or others or unable to care for himself. There must be evidence
171. ld. at 649-50.
172. Nos. 72 C 2104, 72 C 1979 (D.C. N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 23, 1972), Motion
to Dismiss Certain Issues and to File Amended Complaint.
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of a recent overt act or threat.178  The court in Lessard held that
"[a]lthough attempts to predict future conduct are always difficult,
and confinement based upon such a prediction must always be
viewed with suspicion, we believe civil confinement can be justified
in some cases if the proper burden of proof is satisfied and danger-
ousness is based upon finding of a recent overt act, attempt or threat
to do substantial harm to oneself or another.' 174  The court relied
on Humphrey v. Cady,175 where the Supreme Court held, in the
words of the court in Lessard, that "the [Wisconsin] statute itself
requires a finding of 'dangerousness' to self or others in order to
deprive an individual of his or her freedom."'17  While the Supreme
Court had not considered the degree of dangerousness that is consti-
tutionally required before a person may be committed, the Lessard
decision stated that the Supreme Court's
approval of a requirement that the potential for doing harm be 'great
enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty' implies a balancing
test in which the state must bear the burden of proving that there is an
extreme likelihood that if the person is not confined he will do immediate
harm to himself or others. 177
To support this proposition, ,the Court in Lessard cited a discussion
of mental illness:
Obviously, the definition of mental illness is left largely to the user and is
dependent upon the norms of adjustment that he employs. Usually the
use of the phrase 'mental illness' effectively masks the actual norms being
applied. And, because of the unavoidably ambiguous generalities in which
the American Psychiatric Association describes its diagnostic categories,
the diagnostician has the ability to shoehorn into the mentally diseased
class almost any person he wishes, for whatever reason .... 178
The rationale behind requiring a finding of dangerousness to be
supported by a "recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial
harm to oneself or another" is due to the inability of psychiatrists
to predict behavior with any accuracy. This statement is amply su-
ported by testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Rights:
173. See text accompanying note 4, supra.
174. 349 F. Supp. at 1093.
175. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
176. 34 F. Supp. at 1093.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Livermore, Malmquist & Meehi, On the Justifications for Civil Commit-
ment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 80 (1968), cited in 349 F. Supp. at 1094.
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mhe criteria by which we psychiatrists reach our conclusions about
dangerousness, diagnosis, need for treatment, mental illnesses and the like
are so vague and subjective and illusive that well-trained psychiatrists . . .
can manipulate any set of facts to sustain almost any conclusion about
people that they examine. The decision-making process is invisible and
it is untestable. The patient is therefore helpless before the psychiatrist
. . . to rebut these conclusions because the psychiatrist is recognized by law
and custom as the expert.179
Another witness felt that
The state of prediction in our field is abysmally poor, and even experts
cannot tell you with any sureness to what extent a person is likely to do
something. 180
If board certified psychiatrists have difficulty in making accurate
predictions of future conduct, most predictions by "psychiatrists" in
the employment of the Department of Mental Health would appear
even more suspect.'"' In Illinois more judicial guidance in this area
may soon be forthcoming since the issue of whether the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires evidence of a recent
overt threat or act as held in Lessard is pending in both the federal
court 8 2 and the Illinois Appellate Court.18
179. Hearings, supra note 46, at 305 (testimony of Dr. Harold Kaufman, Ad-
junct Professor of Law and Psychiatry, Georgetown University).
180. Hearings, supra note 46, at 83 (testimony of Dr. David J. Vail, Psychiatrist
and Medical Director, Department of Public Welfare, State of Minnesota). Other
observers have also noted this problem. Professor Dershowitz has noted that
Psychiatrists are rather inaccurate predictors [of danger]-inaccurate in
an absolute sense-and even less accurate when compared with other pro-
fessional officials; and when compared to actuarial devices such as pre-
diction of experience tables. Even more significant for legal purposes, it
seems that psychiatrists are particularly prone to one type of error-over-
prediction.
Dershowitz, The Psychiatrists' Power in Civil Commitment, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
47 (Feb. 1969).
Professor Norvel Morris of the University of Chicago Law School has stated:
To take power over the lives of others on predictions of their future crimi-
nality, in particular of the likelihood of future physical injury they may
inflict on others, is no light assumption of competence. Those who cau-
tiously and modestly assess their abilities would, it might seem, hesitate in
the face of such awesome authority; but neither lawyers nor psychiatrists
seem to have been unduly disturbed by such reflections. The distressing
moral problem inherent in this situation can be stated as: Whom shall we
trust? Our reply, for the time being, is: Nobody.
N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GuIDE TO CRIME CONTROL
188-89 (1969).
181. See text accompanying notes 110-12, supra.
182. United States ex rel. Matthew v. Glass, Nos. 72 C 2104, 72 C 1979
(D.C. N.D. Ill., filed Aug. 23, 1972).
183. People v. Sansone, No. 58310 (Ill. App. Ct., 1st Dist., filed, Nov. 22, 1972).
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Right to Remain Silent
In Lessard it was held that a patient "should be told by counsel
and the psychiatrist that he is going to be examined with regard
to his mental condition, that the statements he may make may be
the basis for commitment, and that he does not have to speak to
the psychiatrist."'184  This right rests on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in In re Gault'85 and the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas
in McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institutions:
Whatever the Patuxent procedures may be called-whether civil or crim-
inal-the result under the Self-Incrimination clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment is the same. As we said in In re Gault, . . . there is harm and self-
incrimination whenever there is 'a deprivation of liberty'; and there is such
a deprivation whatever the name of the institution, if a person is held
against his will.' 8 6
The court in Lessard added that medical evidence indicates "that
patients respond more favorably to treatment when they feel they
are being treated fairly and are treated as intelligent, aware, human
beings."'8 7  In United States ex rel. Matthew v. Glass, the issue
of notice of the right to remain silent was raised and dismissed be-
cause "[t]he Department of Mental Health has agreed to inform
orally and in writing those asserted to be in need of mental treatment
that they do not have to talk to the doctors and social worker and
that everything they say might later be repeated at the hearing. '"1 ss
It is interesting to note that the author raised this issue in a recent
case citing the above authority and the judge said that he was not
bound by any lower federal court decisions and that he did not be-
lieve that any such constitutional right exists.
Other Due Process Issues
In United States ex rel. Matthew v. Glass, the plaintiffs raised
the question of whether a patient waiting for an involuntary hearing
could be forced to take medication. The issue was dismissed be-
cause "[tihe Illinois Department of Mental Health has agreed not
184. 349 F. Supp. at 1101.
185. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
186. 407 U.S. 245, 257 (1972).
187. 349 F. Supp. at 1101-02.
188. Nos. 72 C 2104, 72 C 1979 (D.C. N.D. Ill., filed Aug. 23, 1972), Motion
to Dismiss Certain Issues and to File Amended Complaint.
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to drug those asserted to be in need of mental treatment prior to
their hearing against their will, unless the person is acting out in
a manner which would be dangerous to himself or others."' 89
The plaintiffs also alleged that as indigents they had not been
informed of either their right to appointed counsel on appeal
or of their right to petition for discharge. This issue was also dis-
missed because the Circuit Court of Cook County promised to estab-
lish a practice of orally informing those asserted to be in need of
mental treatment of their right to appeal and, if indigent, of their
right to free transcripts and appointed counsel. The Illinois Depart-
ment of Mental Health has also "agreed to provide to those found
to be in need of mental treatment a copy of a statement of their
rights to appeal and of their rights to petition for discharge, together
with the forms necessary to make these requests."1 '
EFFECTS OF INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
Duration
An order for treatment in a hospital1 91 is, at the present time,
for an indeterminate period although the Code provides for periodic
review of the patient's status.' 92 It has been predicted that the Code
will be amended to require commitments for fixed terms because
"[i]t is well established now that after two years, maybe less, the
greatest obstacle to mental health and discharge is institutionalization
itself."'198
Civil Rights
A patient is not automatically adjudged incompetent nor does he
lose his civil rights.' 94 In order for a patient to be found incompe-
189. Id. at 2.
190. Id. at 3.
191. "Order for Treatment or Discharge," MHC form 13 (1968).
192. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 10-2 (1971).
193. Flashner, The Role of the Court as Mental Health Laws Change, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 15, 19 (1973). (Judge Flashner's remarks
were made at a conference held in Chicago on March 15 and 16, 1973 and later
published by the Illinois Institute of Continuing Legal Education). In Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), it was held unconstitutional to detain a de-
fendant found unfit to stand trial for a period longer than is reasonable within which
to determine whether the defendant will be fit to stand trial in the foreseeable
future.
194. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 9-11 (1971).
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tent, there must be a specific finding at the hearing. 19  Incompe-
tency should not be confused with fitness to stand trial. A person
is declared incompetent because he is unable to manage his affairs
and a conservator is appointed in order to perform this function
for the person. Generally, this finding is made by the probate court
since property or other assets are involved. At times the state has
asked the probate court to appoint a physician of the Department
of Mental Health to be the conservator of a patient in order to obtain
approval for an operation. The better practice would be to have
a family member or relative, if available, appointed conservator.
Treatment
The justification for depriving the patient of his liberty is the ex-
pectation that the patient will be given treatment. The Code pro-
vides that "[e]very patient is entitled to adequate and humane care
and treatment,"1 6 and defines "treatment" as including "hospitaliza-
tion, examination, diagnosis, care, detention, training, pharmaceuti-
cals and other services provided for patients in mental health pro-
grams."'19 7 In Rouse v. Cameron,198 the court interpreted a District
of Columbia statute on treatment which provided that a person shall,
"during his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric
treatment . . ."199 to mean that there exists a recognized enforce-
able right to treatment. Since the court based its decision on this
statute, it did not reach the question of whether a constitutional right
to treatment exists. 200
In Wyatt v. Stickney, 20 1 it was held that persons who are involun-
tarily committed as either in need of mental treatment or mentally
retarded have a constitutional right to adequate treatment
because, absent treatment, the hospital is transformed "into a penitentiary
where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense . . . ." The
195. Id.; "Order for Treatment or Discharge," MHC form 13 (1968).
196. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 12-1 (1971).
197. Id. at § 1-8.
198. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
199. D.C. CODE § 21-562 (Supp. V, 1966).
200. The Rouse court did, however, discuss the constitutional aspects. 373 F.2d
at 453-55.
201. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1972), appeal docketed sub nom., Wyatt v.
Aderh61t, No. 72-2634 (5th Cir., Aug. 1, 1972).
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purpose of involuntary hospitalization for treatment purposes is treatment
and not mere custodial care or punishment. This is the only justification,
from a constitutional standpoint, that allows civil commitments ... .202
In effecting these principles, the court set minimum standards for
hospital staff and physical facilities.
Burnham v. Dept. of Public Health20 held that no constitutional
right to treatment exists and the court there even questioned the
justiciability of the issue due to the uncertainty of the meaning of
treatment.20 4  In New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Rockefeller,2 °5 it was also held that there was no constitutionally
based right to treatment.206
It has been suggested by Dr. Morton Birnbaum that the right
to treatment should include a requirement for a "minimum number
of consultations and physical examinations within a certain period
of time" as well as
the availability of halfway houses and other full-time post-hospitalization
facilities. For it has been repeatedly shown that the lack of these facilities
hinders not only the planning for the care of the patient while he is in
the hospital, but also hinders his discharge.2 07
This same psychiatrist-lawyer takes the position that, while the law
should require some basic minimum standards of care and treat-
ment, it should not set out any requirement concerning such subjec-
tive treatment as chemotherapy, shock treatment, and psycho-ther-
apy, since these have traditionally been solely medical questions.208
Contrary to that position, others have argued that standards of treat-
ment can be measured by the effectiveness of the treatment.200
On the reverse side of this question, no surgery, including experi-
mental procedures, 21 0 may be performed without the patient's con-
202. Id. at 784 (court's emphasis).
203. 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-3110 (5th
Cir. Oct. 4, 1972) (Wyatt, supra note 200, and Burnham have been consolidated on
appeal).
204. Id. at 1340-42.
205. 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. N.Y. 1973).
206. Id. at 758-65.
207. Hearings, supra note 46, at 44 (testimony of Dr. Morton Birnbaum,
Member of the New York City Bar).
208. Id. at 62.
209. See, e.g., Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: The
Need for Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 8 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. Lm.
L. REV. 513 (1973).
210. There is some fear of psychosurgery.
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sent except when an emergency exists and the life of the patient
is endangered. In that case, "consent need not be obtained, pro-
vided substantiation of the emergency is documented. 211  The deci-
sion to accept or refuse surgery is a civil right of the patient which
he may exercise as long as he has not been declared incompetent.
The Department of Mental Health has set out the elements of in-
formed consent which must be obtained before the patient partici-
pates in any "behavioral and medical science investigations where
a procedure may induce in the subject an altered state or condition
potentially harmful to his personal welfare. '212  These elements are:
1. A full and fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, including
an identification of those which are experimental;
2. A description of the attendant discomforts and risks;
3. A description of the benefits to be expected;
4. A disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures that would be ad-
vantageous for the subject;
5. An offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures;
6. An instruction that the subject is free to withdraw his consent and to
discontinue participation in the project or activity at any time.
In addition, the agreement, written or oral, which the subject enters
into, should include no exculpatory language through which the subject is
made to waive, or to appear to waive, any of his/her legal rights, or to re-
lease the facility or its agents from liability for negligence. 2 18
The requirements of informed consent apply with equal force to elec-
tro-shock treatment.214
In Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health21 5 it was
held that a patient "who is involuntarily detained in a state institu-
Psychosurgery is a term used rather broadly these days to describe surgi-
cal, electrical, and other alterations of the brain to change human behavior.
An important distinguishing feature of any psychosurgical procedure is
irreversibility. Once the brain tissue is altered, it can never be the same
again. Since the brain is the essence of what we refer to as personality, it
follows that psychosurgery irrevocably alters personality. . . . Even at its
best, therefore, psychosurgery is the most hazardous form of psychiatric
treatment yet devised and currently the most controversial.
Restak, The Promise and Peril of Psychosurgery, SATURDAY REVIEW/WORLD at 54
(Sept. 15, 1973).
211. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911 , § 1-8 (1971); DMH Rule 12.03 (1969).
212. ILL. DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS 3 (Oct. 1973).
213. Id. at 2.
214. DMH Rule 12.03 (1969).
215. 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (Mich. Cir. Ct., July 10, 1973).
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tion is legally incapable of consenting to undergo experimental surgi-
cal procedures that are designed to change his behavior by irreversi-
bly destroying his abnormal brain tissue."21  The court stated that
"[t]o be legally adequate, a subject's informed consent must be com-
petent, knowing and voluntary."2 17 To be competent, the patient must
rationally understand the nature of the procedure, its risks and other
relevant information. First, "[e]ven if an involuntarily detained pa-
tient can intellectually comprehend his circumstances, the very na-
ture of his incarceration diminishes his capacity to consent to psycho-
surgery."21  Second, "knowledgeable consent to psychosurgery is
literally impossible" since so little is really known about its effects. 219
Finally, it is difficult for the consent to be voluntary:
The most important thing to an involuntarily detained mental patient is
freedom. When freedom is dependent upon a patient's cooperation with the
authorities, it is impossible for the patient to be free of ulterior forms of
restraint or coercion when giving his consent to experimental surgery.
The institutional environment is inherently coercive. Patients who are
involuntarily confined cannot reason as equals with the doctors and ad-
ministrators. This inherent inequality in their position makes them in-
capable of voluntarily giving an informed consent to undergo psycho-
surgery.2 2 0
The patient may not be kept in restraints without a physician's
prescription and then only for limited periods of time.221 Restraints
may only be used on a patient "to prevent physical injury to himself
or others. In no event shall restraints be utilized solely to punish
or discipline a patient, nor are restraints to be used as a convenience
for the staff."222  In Wheeler v. Glass,223 the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held a complaint which alleged that two mentally re-
tarded youths in a state hospital had been bound to their beds in
spread-eagle fashion in a public area of the hospital for 77'/2
hours after an alleged consensual homosexual act and had been
216. Id. at 2064.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. The court also held that, even with the patient's formal consent, much
psychosurgery would violate the patient's first amendment right to generate ideas,
as well as his constitutionally protected right to privacy.
221. DMH Rule 12.02 (1973).
222. Id. There are also limits on the seclusion of a patient, DMH Rule 12.03
(1969).
223. 473 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973).
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forced to scrub walls for over ten consecutive hours to be sufficient
to state a cause of action for deprivation of their civil rights. The
plaintiffs also alleged that they were subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth amendment.
APPEALS, TRANSFER AND DISCHARGES
While a patient may appeal the "Order for Treatment or Dis-
charge" as in other civil cases, 2 4 it takes far too long for it to be
an adequate remedy for obtaining the patient's discharge. A more
effective remedy is a "Petition for Discharge," 225 accompanied by
a certificate of a physician,226 which states that the patient is either
no longer in need of hospitalization for mental treatment, or in need
of care and custody, or mentally retarded, and which sets forth the
facts upon which such a statement is based.227 If the petitioner
is indigent, the court will appoint a physician or psychologist to ex-
amine the patient and execute a certificate of a physician.2 The
patient will then be given a hearing identical to a commitment hear-
ing.
The Department of Mental Health "shall, as frequently as practi-
cable but not less than every 6 months, review the need for contin-
ued hospitalization of the patient, and make the results of such ex-
amination a part of the patient's record. '2 29  At least once during
the first year of hospitalization and once during every two year
period thereafter, the Department of Mental Health must file a writ-
ten report230 "setting forth the reasons supporting the need for fur-
ther hospitalization of the patient."' 231  At the time of the written
report the hospital must give notice23 2 to the patient, his attorney,
224. MHC form 21 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91%, § 7-3 (1971).
225. MHC form 23 (1968). This petition must contain the patient's name, the
underlying circumstances, the date of the prior court order which had either hos-
pitalized the patient or had him placed in the care and custody of another person, a
request for discharge and the reasons for that request. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
91 , § 10-1 (1971).
226. MHC form 23 (1968).
227. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91%, § 10-1 (1971).
228. Id. at § 10-3.
229. Id. at § 10-2. The results can be found in the patient's chart on the ward.
230. .ld.; MHC form 27 (1968).
231. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 , § 10-2 (1971).
232. MHC form 29 (1968).
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his nearest relative and two other persons designated by the patient,
and to the court.2 3  The patient is then entitled to a hearing on
the need for continued hospitalization if he sends a request for one
to the superintendent, to the hospital or to the court within ten days
after receipt of the notice.2"4 This hearing is procedurally identical
to the commitment hearing.
In Davis v. Levitt,2"5 the Department of Mental Health decided
to discharge a patient who wished to remain in the hospital for treat-
ment. The plaintiff argued that he could not be discharged without
a hearing since treatment is a valuable right to which he is entitled
by statute. To deprive him of treatment without a hearing, plaintiff
argued, is a violation of due process.2 36
If a patient leaves the hospital on unauthorized leave, that is, with-
out being discharged and "such patient is considered by the superin-
tendent to be in such condition as to require immediate detention
for the protection of such patient or other persons" the superintend-
ent may request the police to apprehend and return the patient. 2 7
If the patient is not deemed to be dangerous to himself or others
it will be on his records as "discharged against medical advice."2 8
Transfers
The Code provides that "[t]he Department may transfer any pa-
tient from one state hospital to another whenever such transfer is
deemed advisable. ' 239  However, it has been held that when the
233. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, § 10-2 (1971); MHC form 28 (1968).
234. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91Y2, § 10-2 (1971).
235. No. 73 Co 895 (I1. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., filed July 5, 1973).
236. The suit relies heavily on Burchett v. Bower, 355 F. Supp. 1278 (D.Ariz.
1973) where the court held that a prisoner could not be transferred from a mental
hospital back to prison without a hearing because treatment was a right protected
by the fourteenth amendment.
237. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91M/, § 12-6 (1971).
238. It is . . . Department policy that a patient on unauthorized absence,
whether voluntary or committed, should be discharged after a reasonable
period of time and no attempt shall be made to expend the energies of the
Department in notifying law enforcement authorities for the purpose of
apprehending said patient unless the patient is deemed to be dangerous to
himself or the community.
DMH Rule 5.01(4) (1970). However, relatives, conservators or guardians must
be notified immediately of the unauthorized absence of the patient. DMH Rule
5.02 (1969).
239. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911h, § 12-4 (1971).
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Department wishes to transfer a patient to the maximum security
hospital at Chester, the patient is entitled to an administrative hear-
ing before a committee.240  The requirements set forth in the hold-
ing have been promulgated as a regulation of the Department.24' The
committee must consist of at least three experienced mental health
professionals, one of whom must be a board certified psychiatrist.
The patient has a right to counsel, and a written transcript. Before
the committee approves a transfer, all available alternatives must be
considered, including transfer to other programs within the facility
or to another facility with a suitable program.242 Upon approval
of transfer, the committee records the reasons for its finding and
formulates:
a treatment plan describing what the . . . committee expects the treatment
program can accomplish and an estimate of the length of time, in their
judgment, that the patient is expected to reside at the Illinois Security
Hospital or a facility's maximum security unit.243
The hearings in Cook County are informal. The physician and
thereapist must explain why they wish to transfer the patient to a
maximum security hospital and before questions can be asked of
these witnesses, the committee often asks the patient to comment.
This makes it difficult for the attorney to structure his case. Hear-
say testimony is generally not admitted into evidence. Thus, the physi-
cians often cannot testify as to facts not of their own knowledge.
Often none of the parties desiring the transfer have first hand facts
either. The chairman of the committee generally refuses to allow
more than one attorney to represent the patient or even attend the
hearing.
All of the hospitals in Cook County are "short term" hospitals
where patients are admitted for sixty days. The general policy of
the Department is that if the patient does not show improvement
within sixty days, he is to be transferred to a long term hospital
for extended treatment. This policy has been challenged on the
ground that a patient has an interest in his treatment and drastic
240. In the Interest of -, 72 Co. NMT 2635 (Ill. Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty. 1973)
(opinion and order) in Flashner, supra note 193, at 31. (Judge Schneider, who
included the case in the volume, withheld the names of the parties for their pro-
tection.)
241. DMH Rule 14.01 (1973).
242. Id.
243. Id.
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changes cannot be made solely because he is a long term patient.
In Levitzke v. Levitt,24 4 it was argued that if the patient being trans-
ferred opposes transfer, he is entitled to a hearing at which the De-
partment must justify its action.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
A provision of the new Illinois constitution protects the mentally
handicapped. Section 19 provides:
All persons with a physical or mental handicap shall be free from dis-
crimination in the sale or rental of property and shall be free from dis-
crimination unrelated to ability in the hiring and promotion practices of
any employer. 245
The state legislature implemented this constitutional provision by
passing the Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act 4' on Au-
gust 23, 1971. The Act provides criminal penalties for its violation.
CONCLUSION
At the present time, the emphasis in mental health law is focus-
ing more and more upon the task of ensuring that no individual
will be involuntarily committed without being provided full due
process rights; that a person who is deprived of his liberty on the
basis that he is in need of treatment will, in fact, be provided with
adequate treatment; and that patients will be released when they
are no longer in need of treatment. This trend in mental health law
is quite similar to the early stages of the criminal law revolution
of the 1960's which gave tremendous scope to constitutional protec-
tions afforded defendants in criminal proceedings.
While the Mental Health Code of 1967 went a long way towards
protecting the rights of persons involved in the commitment process,
many more changes are needed to fully protect their rights. Many
of the issues examined in this article have been debated and dis-
cussed for some time. The time for implementation and active re-
form is at hand.
244. No. 73 Co 887 (Ill. Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty., filed July 6, 1973).
245. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (1970).
246. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 65 (1971).
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